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Abstract 
Ethics and leadership are vital to any organization. Within the intelligence community 
leaders have an unquestionable role in the security of a nation and often deal with 
disturbing information and sometimes operate in personal danger to obtain valuable 
information. In some instances, unethical tactics (such as stealing or eavesdropping on 
an unsuspected conversation) are used to obtain information on potential national 
threats. In an ordinary life eavesdropping on someone else’s conversation or hacking 
into their computer would be considered a serious breach of courtesy and/or social 
convention. However, in the intelligence world, unethical tactics are necessary to protect 
nations and the people living within them. The purpose of this paper is to investigate 
ethics and intelligence and the role leadership plays. The paper begins by exploring the 
key elements of intelligence and the different methods of collecting information. Next, the 
paper outlines the three main approaches to ethics and how they can be applied to 
intelligence agencies. Then, the role of leadership in ethics and intelligence services is 
explored. Finally, the paper concludes with a discussion surrounding the difficulty in 
researching ethics, intelligence and leadership in intelligence agencies. 
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1. Introduction 
Intelligence as a form of statecraft is a far from new phenomenon and is regarded as one of the world‟s 
oldest professions (Hulnick & Mattausch, 1989; Jones, 2010; Nolte, 2009). There is a long list of 
historical evidence that suggests intelligence has been around for thousands of years. The Bible has 
various passages about the use of intelligence and there are suggestions that the Babylon Tablets comprise 
elements relating to spying (Hulnick & Mattausch, 1989). Even well known historical events contain 
traces of some type of intelligence. The Lewis and Clark expedition, for example, is primarily known as 
one of exploration; however, their mission was also to collect intelligence for the United States of 
America (USA), which would be helpful for the growth and expansion of the nation (Nolte, 2009). In the 
modern world intelligence gathering has increased significantly in response to demands that impact 
national security (especially following September 11, 2001 (9/11)) such as countering espionage, people 
smuggling and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and is now an inescapable necessity 
(Cornall & Black, 2011).  
Due to the nature of the profession, intelligence officers obtain information using both overt operations 
(information is public) and/or covert operations (information is not public). Intelligence professionals 
around the world are taught and encouraged by their leaders and agencies to use unethical tactics or 
“tradecraft” (e.g. lie, deceive, steal, and manipulate) in order to obtain this information. Even so, some of 
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these operations breach ethical standards, sometimes even resulting in human rights being taken away 
(Herman, 2010). These practices would be considered unethical and illegal if practiced in everyday life; 
however, in the intelligence world they are ethically acceptable when national security is at risk (Hulnick 
& Mattausch, 1989).   
Over the last few years there have been several controversial cases (especially those involving suspected 
terrorists) that underline the need for more ethical guidelines surrounding intelligence practices. One of 
the most published examples is the detention of Binyam Mohamed at Guantanamo Bay (Townsend, 
2009). While detained, Mohamed admitted that he trained in the al-Qaeda terrorist training camp. 
However, these charges were later dropped by the USA because the evidence against him was obtained 
by using extreme, inhumane torture techniques (Bellaby, 2012; Townsend, 2009). This is also apparent 
for much of the Bush administration and the hunt for Osama Bin Ladin. The issue of torture and the 
legitimate treatment of individuals suspected of terrorist activities has been at the forefront of discussions, 
leading a number of countries to investigate national intelligence services and the way in which political 
leaders have handled intelligence through special and parliamentary inquiries (Anderson, 2001; Bellaby, 
2012; Born & Wetzling, 2009). 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate ethics and intelligence and the role leadership plays in ethical 
decision making. The paper explores the key elements of intelligence and the different methods of 
collecting information. The paper outlines the three main theoretical approaches to ethics and how they 
can be applied to intelligence organisations. It examines the role of leadership in ethics and intelligence 
services, before concluding with a discussion surrounding the difficulty of researching ethics, intelligence 
and leadership in intelligence organisations. 
 
2. Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Defined 
Prior to 9/11 the relationship between intelligence and ethics was very limited (Omand & Phythian, 
2013). Post 9/11 the literature on intelligence and ethics has developed significantly; however, there are 
still areas that lack a comprehensive understanding. One of the main drawbacks in this field is that there is 
no conscenus on the definition of intelligence.  
At the broadest level intelligence is both a process and a product and can be defined as either “the means  
it was obtained” (e.g. intelligence being covertly obtained information without the authority of the group 
who owns the information) or by the “outcomes” it makes possible (e.g. intelligence being the collection 
and processing of information about foreign countries for a government‟s foreign policy and national 
security) (Bimfort, 1995; Cornall & Black, 2011; Flood, 2004). Herman (2010) defines intelligence as 
“information and information gathering, not doing things to people; no one gets hurt by it, at least not 
directly” (p. 342). However, as Omand and Phythian (2013) acknowledge the post 9/11 era has shown 
that intelligence collection not only involves doing things to people, but also involves hurting people in 
the process. 
From a narrower security perspective, an independent review of the intelligence community by Cornall 
and Black (2011) defines intelligence as “information that enables you to protect your interests or to 
maintain a valuable advantage in advancing your interests over those posing threats to them” (p. 6). This 
definition is quite broad and focuses only on the outcome, which is national security. While debate 
continues over the definition of intelligence there does seem to be a consensus among scholars that 
intelligence involves information, regardless of the purpose and types of methods used to obtain it 
(Turner, 1990).  
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Another type of intelligence is called counter-intelligence (CI). CI is an activity dedicated to collecting 
information for one‟s own nation against espionage and sabotage (Turner, 1990). Collecting information 
on potential national security threats is not an easy task. It involves a large amount of human resources 
and the most up-to-date technology. Then again, even with the most sophisticated software and experts in 
the intelligence field there have been major events in history where information collected was 
misunderstood or misinterpreted (Bar-Joseph, 2010). The attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941, and 
similarly the 9/11 attacks by al-Qaeda for example are known as complete intelligence blunders (Bar-
Joseph, 2010; Wohlstetter, 1962).  
 
3. Nature of Intelligence Work 
Intelligence work consists mainly of the collection and analysis of information that is generally available 
to anyone with the right resources (Quinlan, 2007).  Generally, the first stage of intelligence is utilising 
open source material. For example, intelligence officers “read books, journal articles, newspapers, 
magazines, attend academic conferences, and exchange views with people in the know” (Turner, 1990, p. 
289). When information is not publically available, intelligence officers use a variety of methods to 
collect intelligence: 1) Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) which is the interception of foreign 
communications; 2) Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) which is derived from the collection and analysis 
of images and geospatial information (physical information in the form of maps or three-dimensional 
virtual representations of landscapes, etc.) about the features and events with reference to location and 
time (Cornall & Black, 2011, p. 7); and 3) Human Intelligence (HUMINT), which is the direct, personal 
involvement of intelligence officers with another person who has been recruited or has volunteered to 
betray their own government (Nolte, 2009).   
Even though HUMINT is the most common method used, all three are utilised to build a stronger 
understanding of the information obtained. Within the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), HUMINT is 
relied on to obtain information that is not normally available through other sources (Turner, 1990). In this 
instance, the CIA employs case officers who recruit foreign nationals to gain access to information as 
well as help with understanding the information (Turner, 1990).  
When information is not easily accessible it is obtained through covert operations, such as eavesdropping, 
cracking codes, intercepting private communications, observing activities that would be preferred to be 
unobserved, and interrogation (Quinlan, 2007). For example, during the Bush administration‟s war on 
terrorism, any intelligence about the enemy (even that gained through unethical interrogation techniques) 
was considered necessary to protect the American people (Vest, 2005).  An example of such interrogation 
methods is where “terror suspects overseas are kidnapped and delivered to third-party countries for 
interrogation – which, not uncharacteristically, includes some measure of torture and sometimes fatal 
torture” (Vest, 2005, p. 3651). There are some scholars who support and endorse the argument that 
“torture [sometimes] works” (Bagaric & Clark, 2005; Posner & Vermeule, 2005). These scholars believe 
that when torture is used for informational purposes to unveil a potential threat to national security its use 
is therefore morally justifiable (Welsh, 2010/2011). Bowen (2003) states “like any sensitive person, I 
don‟t relish the idea of inflicting pain on someone, or making someone miserable. But by the same token, 
if you can save lives – if people are plotting mass murder and you have a chance of preventing it – it‟s 
hard to argue against whatever methods work” (p. 4). Bowen (2003) also goes on to argue that gathering 
intelligence information by means of psychological manipulation may be more effective than by physical 
manipulation or torture. 
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However, there have also been well documented cases by the media into the US Government‟s 
interrogation practices and many former CIA officers have spoken out about how these techniques are 
simply just wrong (Vest, 2005). Burton L. Gerber, a former CIA agent after 39 years of service has 
spoken out saying that he opposes torture “because it corrupts the society that tolerates it”. Gerber‟s 
reasoning is “that a standard is changed, and that new standard that‟s acceptable is less than what our 
nation should stand for. I think the standards in something like this are crucial to the identity of America 
as a free and just society” (Vest, 2005, p. 3651). Gerber further states that “torture almost always fails to 
yield true or useful information; it has the potential to adversely affect CIA operations” (Vest, 2005, p. 
3651).  
In an ordinary life, if you were to hack into someone else‟s computer or torture them to obtain 
information this would be a serious breach of privacy and be illegal (Quinlan, 2007). Whether intelligence 
officers gather intelligence that is available to anyone or obtain it in a covert manner they must still 
operate within an ethical framework (Quinlan, 2007). Together, intelligence professionals and 
representatives from the policy agencies need to attempt to weigh competing requirements, assess the 
availability of relevant open source material, and operate in some type of ethical realm.  
 
4. Ethical Approaches  
There are three main approaches to studying ethics in the current literature: realism, consequentialism, 
idealism and “just war” or “just intelligence” theory. 
According to the realist approach, intelligence activities are justified if they serve the well-being of the 
state and rest on the “moral duty of the sovereign to protect her subjects” (Gill, 2009, p.89). Thinking 
such as Niccolo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes advocates realism (Jones, 2010). According to Hobbes, 
governments are entitled to “do anything” that seems necessary to protect national security (Erskine, 
2004). Therefore, nothing is really off limits for governments wanting to gather information from abroad, 
especially in times of war (Jones, 2010). On the same level, nations have no inherent right of privacy 
against other nations during peacetime (Herman, 2010). From a realist perspective, when an intelligence 
officer engages in what would be considered unethical behaviour (e.g. lie, cheat, blackmail, etc.) these 
actions are not considered unethical because they are all necessary for national security (Jones, 2010). 
The consequentialist approach is more concerned with the ends rather than the means and judges actions 
by the value of their consequences (Jones, 2010). It also does not advocate an “anything goes” policy; it is 
dependent on the ends outweighing the means (Jones, 2010). According to the consequentialist approach 
“intelligence activities will be acceptable if they maximize the good through balancing the benefits of 
increased knowledge against the costs of how it might have been acquired” (Gill, 2009, p.89). However, 
the definition of what is considered a “good outcome”, as Jones (2010) points out, depends on who it is 
good for. 
The third approach to ethics is idealism or deontologicalism. This approach is based on the work by Kant, 
where morality is regarded as an absolute (e.g. “Thou shalt not kill”) without any exception and where 
“people must be treated as ends in themselves, not as tools” (Gill, 2009, p. 90; Jones, 2010, p. 23). 
According to this approach, some of the methods used to collect intelligence (such as deception and theft 
in covert operations) are considered morally unethical (Gendron, 2004). To satisfy this approach, only 
publicly available information would be acceptable. The current collection methods used by intelligence 
agencies (e.g. any covert operations) would be deemed unacceptable. However, if this was actually 
implemented into today‟s world many nations would fail to protect their national security as most 
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information can only be obtained through covert operations. However, as Hobbes observes, without some 
form of covert intelligences “sovereigns can have no more idea what orders need to be given for the 
defence of their subjects than spiders can know when to emerge and where to make for without the 
threads of their webs” (cited in Erskine, 2004, p. 304). In the end, realism and idealism are on the 
complete opposite ends of the scale. Both of these approaches attempt to distinguish all moral questions 
into a black or white category (Jones, 2010). 
The final approach is the “just war”, also known as the “just intelligence” approach, and is commonly 
accepted as the most reasonable way of addressing the ethics–intelligence dilemma. This approach is 
based on “structured reasoning” (Gill, 2009, p. 90) and is used:  
To distinguish between the conditions under which an object can justly be targeted by an 
intelligence agency (jus ad intelligentiam) and the manner in which intelligence agents and 
entities conduct themselves thereafter (jus in intelligentia), in much the same way as classic 
Just War theory distinguishes between just causes of war (jus ad bellum) and the just conduct 
of war (jus in bello). (Omand & Phythian, 2013, p. 42)  
For example, at times of war, military professions are exempt from ordinary laws (e.g. they have the right 
to use covert methods to obtain information from a national threat and also have the right to kill). As 
Jones (2010) acknowledges, outside times of war these professionals would be considered liars and 
murderers.  
It is important to remember that intelligence gathering is a constant state and as the former Director of 
Central Intelligence, Robert Gates, expresses, “while a nation is at peace...we in intelligence are 
constantly at war” (cited in Lathrop, 2004, p. 205).  
 
5. Leadership and Ethics 
The study of ethics is all about human relationships and how we behave in the different roles we play, this 
includes the role of leaders (Ciulla, 2004). To Geoffrey Harpham, ethics is simply “the site of a desire for 
a clean conscience” (Harpham, 1999, p. xiii). According to Trevino (1986) ethics is a code of values, 
moral principles and behaviours (acceptable and unacceptable) that guides an individual‟s behaviour as to 
what is right from what is wrong. Regardless of how you define ethics, it is important that context is 
understood to play a critical role in determining between normative ethics (e.g. what one should do) and 
descriptive ethics (e.g. what one actually decides to does) (Whatley, 2012).  
Leadership is vital to any organisation and plays a key role in the culture and ethical standards within an 
organisation (Plinio, 2009). A good leader needs to behave in ways that influence the behaviour of their 
followers (Plinio, 2009). They must also provide direction and assess the needs and expectations of their 
followers in order to influence them to work towards the vision and benefit of the organisation (Kangungo 
& Mendonca, 2012). They must have a deep understanding of the core values and that all of the rules 
assumed as a leader “need to be founded or rooted in some solid commitments: to common ethical values; 
to the voice of professional convictions; to your personal conscience; and to your professional and social 
constraints (codes)” (Donlevy & Walker, 2011, p. 19). The greatest strength and the greatest weakness of 
leaders is that they are all human beings and therefore at times can act as “unpredictable creatures, 
capable of extra-ordinary kindness and cruelty” (Ciulla, 2005, p. 1). 
Many authors agree that ethics is an important aspect of leadership (Burns, 1978; Ciulla, 2004; 
Thompson, 2000; Yukl, 2012). It has been further argued that ethics and ethical decision-making are the 
heart of leadership (Ciulla, 2004. Ethical leadership can be as simple as a “matter of leaders having a 
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good character” (Freeman & Stewart, 2006, p. 2). However, ethical leadership is not as simple as “do the 
right thing” or “if you talk the talk, and walk the walk” (Plinio, 2009, p.278). As Trevino, and Brown put 
it:  
The ethical decision-making process involves multiple stages that are fraught with 
complications and contextual pressures. Individuals may not have the cognitive sophistication 
to make the right decision. And most people will be influenced by peers‟ and leaders‟ words 
and actions, and by concerns about the consequences of their behavior in the work 
environment. (200, p. 71)  
Ethical leadership is therefore defined as “the demonstration of normatively appropriate conduct through 
personal actions and interpersonal relationships, and the promotion of such conduct to followers through 
two-way communication, reinforcement and decision-making” (Brown, Trevino & Harrison, 2005, p. 
120). 
The commitment of intelligence officers and their leaders has an unquestionable role in the security of a 
nation. Intelligence officers work under the stress of a great responsibility and often deal with disturbing 
information and sometimes operate in personal danger to obtain valuable information. Intelligence 
professionals around the world are taught and encouraged by their leaders to use unethical tactics (such as 
lie, deceive, and steal) in order to obtain such information. Ethical standards may be breached if applied 
to the real world. However, in the world of intelligence it is a necessity to partake in unethical practices in 
order to protect a nation and the people within in it. Overall, leadership has a significant role in producing 
ethical or unethical practice within any organization, including any intelligence agency. 
 
6. The Difficulty with Intelligence, Ethics and Leadership, and Recommendations 
There are many difficulties in studying intelligence, ethics and leadership. The main hurdle is the secrecy 
surrounding the intelligence community. This secrecy is a necessity for any country, especially when it 
comes to national security, yet it makes it extremely difficult to understand the specific activies that 
intelligence officers engage in (Born & Wills, 2010). There is also a lack of public information regarding 
the standards in intelligence (Born & Wills, 2010). The “task before intelligence agencies now is to build 
higher fences around fewer secrets, limiting protection only to sources and methods that merit it, while 
disclosing as much as possible of everything else”(Gries, 2007, p. 2). Although there has been a good 
start in reducing secrecy within the intelligence community (e.g. the CIA provides a variety of 
unclassified maps and reference documents both to the intelligence community and the public), it is 
unrealistic to assume that intelligence agencies will eventually be completely open and transparent and 
therefore they will continue to make it difficult to fully understand all the dynamics of intelligence and 
CI. 
The second hurdle is leadership in an environment which is unstable, ever changing and complex; thereby 
making being an intelligence leader extremely difficult and demanding. An intelligence officer‟s career is 
far from conventional and faces a number of ethical considerations that are not typical to other 
professions (Hudson, 2010). The intelligence community is also regulated by domestic and international 
law which makes it difficult to establish laws and rules which are put in place for every conceivable 
situation (Born & Wills, 2010).  
Many intelligence agencies are large bureaucracies, where the staff functions within a hierarchy and 
where responsibility can fragment (Erskine, 2001). It is therefore imperative that specific ethical 
guidelines are available to these officers to help deal with ethical dilemmas (Hudson, 2010). Many 
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academics and intelligence professionals agree and have called for a more coherent ethical framework 
(Bellaby, 2012).  
Hudson (2010) points out that there is already language in effect to various policy documents within the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), but none have been consolidated into a single 
ethical guidance document. Hudson (2010) suggests that the American Bar Association (ABA) Model 
Rules, used by attorneys, can be used as a foundation for an ethical guide. Some examples of the ABA 
Model Rules are: treating one‟s profession as an ethical pursuit; placing one‟s professional role within a 
broader social and political framework; proffering specific guidance on issues particular to a given 
profession; binding the entirety of practitioners to make competence and expertise the primary 
qualification, rather than ethical flexibility, and ensuring the integrity of the profession through dedicated 
disciplinary processes (cited in Hudson, 2010). 
 
7. Conclusion 
To some the terms ethics and intelligence may be considered a contradiction of terms (Godfrey, 1978) 
and to others there is simply no place for ethics in intelligence (Gill, 2009). According to Duane R. 
Clarridge, a CIA officer for over 30 years, “Depending on where you‟re coming from, the whole business 
of espionage is unethical … intelligence ethics is an oxymoron. It‟s not an issue. It never was and never 
will be, not if you want a real spy service” (cited in Gill, 2009, p. 89). However, intelligence is deep-
rooted in many core ethical principles, such as telling the truth and the sole purpose of intelligence is to 
provide policymakers with a close and accurate depiction of a given situation (Godfrey, 1978). But in 
fact, finding out the truth about a situation is rarely a simple fact and is almost always a combination of 
fact and judgment (Godfrey, 1978).  There are not necessarily any right answers to ethical questions about 
intelligence, nor can issues relating to ethical intelligence be classified as black or white (Jones, 2010). 
Intelligence is a necessary and valuable tool to all nations and it is therefore important that we gain a 
more comprehensive and coherent understanding of the role of ethics in intelligence and how leadership 
helps facilitate this role. 
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